

even pretending that they were resisting attack. In every case the governing consideration was national interest, and most of them had little excuse to throw stones at one another. All

alike were functioning in an unorganized world. Must we then accept as a grim necessity the doctrine that moral standards, recognized by individual citizens as categorical imperatives for the ordering of their lives and accepted to-day by the more advanced nations as binding in their domestic transactions, must remain for ever inapplicable in

the relations of states ? I see no reason for such a despairing conclusion. The moralization of community life within the national frontiers, which is taken as a matter of course by the unthinking citizen, represents a gigantic achievement requiring many centuries of effort. Feudal anarchy, civil war, highway

robbery, duelling have disappeared. The supremacy of brute force has retreated before the conception of the reign of law.

To our remote forefathers the task of organizing the life of a large-scale community must have seemed as Utopian as that of tidying up the world seems to many people to-day. Yet the

difficulties have been overcome so completely in the narrower sphere that most of us forget that they ever existed. It has

become an axiom that decisions reached by consultation and compromise are the most likely to endure. But the commonplace of to-day was once a romantic dream. We remember

Hobbes' celebrated description of the state of Nature.

"No arts ; no letters ; no society; and what is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." We have

escaped from that predicament by the growth of the community sense and by the creation of institutions in which it found expression*

The human family is only the local group on a larger scale.

Its essential unity is much harder to visualize, but the necessity of organization as the condition of well-being is as clear in the one case as in the other. If it was not so obvious before the World War, that cataclysm should have removed the mist from our eyes.

One serious effort to organize Europe, and only one, was made before 1919. The Holy Alliance left a bad name, which it did not altogether deserve. Alexander I is not merely the most interesting of the Russian Tsars, but the most attractive figure on the European chessboard at the opening of the nineteenth century. Beginning life as a sentimental republican he ascended the throne of his murdered father with the loftiest